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COLLABORATION IN HUMANITARIAN LOGISTICS:  
COMPARATIVE ANALYSIS OF DISASTER  
RESPONSE IN CHILE AND HAITI 2010 
 
ABSTRACT 
The objective of this project is to examine the relationships that occur during 
collaboration and cooperation amongst multiple agents (government, military, non-
governmental) in the immediate aftermath of major natural catastrophes requiring the 
deployment of extensive humanitarian relief efforts.  Specifically, the process of 
collaboration and the formation of interagency relationships and the effect on the 
humanitarian supply chain’s efficiency in providing aid immediately in devastated areas 
and the creation of positive social relationships that spur the process of healing and 
recovery amongst local populations and aid providers. Furthermore, with military 
organizations having an increasing role in providing aid, and the involvement of non-
governmental organizations as specialists in disaster relief, these relationships have a 
large effect on the ability and success of a humanitarian operation in providing relief 
efficiently in terms of time, money and lives.  Often the same conflicts reoccur resulting 
in wasted efforts of “reinventing the wheel” and protecting organizational interests 
instead of expending energies in providing aid. 
 vi
THIS PAGE INTENTIONALLY LEFT BLANK 
 vii
TABLE OF CONTENTS 
I. INTRODUCTION........................................................................................................1 
A. BACKGROUND ..............................................................................................1 
B. OBJECTIVE ....................................................................................................2 
1. Scope......................................................................................................2 
2. Benefits of Study ..................................................................................3 
C. ORGANIZATION AND METHODOLOGY................................................3 
II. LITERATURE REVIEW ...........................................................................................5 
A. INTRODUCTION............................................................................................5 
B. CONCEPTUAL FRAMEWORK LITERATURE .......................................5 
1.  Organizational Conflict .......................................................................5 
2. Organizational Cooperation in Crises ...............................................7 
3. Anatomy of Disaster Relief .................................................................8 
4. Humanitarian Logistics .......................................................................9 
5. Healing Communities in Conflict .....................................................10 
6. Organizational Healing .....................................................................11 
C. THE MODERN HUMANITARIAN SYSTEM...........................................13 
1. Introduction........................................................................................13 
2. Actors ..................................................................................................14 
a. Non-Governmental Organizations .........................................14 
b. Inter-Governmental Organizations ........................................17 
c. Donors .....................................................................................18 
d. Recipient Governments ...........................................................19 
e. Military ....................................................................................20 
f. Media .......................................................................................21 
3. Failures of Inter-Agency Cooperation and Opportunities for 
Improvement ......................................................................................21 
a. Planning/Training ..................................................................22 
b. Coordination............................................................................22 
c. Communication.......................................................................22 
d. Leadership ...............................................................................23 
D. CHAPTER SUMMARY................................................................................23 
III. COUNTRY CASE LITERATURE ..........................................................................25 
A. INTRODUCTION..........................................................................................25 
B. CHILE.............................................................................................................25 
1. Country Information .........................................................................25 
2. Chilean Earthquake Sequence of Events.........................................27 
C. HAITI..............................................................................................................32 
1. Country Information .........................................................................32 
2. Haitian Earthquake Sequence of Events .........................................33 
D. CHAPTER SUMMARY................................................................................39 
IV. ASSESSING HUMANITARIAN RESPONSE........................................................41 
 viii
A. INTRODUCTION..........................................................................................41 
B. POST-EARTHQUAKE CIVIL STABILITY .............................................41 
1. Chile ....................................................................................................41 
2. Haiti.....................................................................................................43 
C. FOOD DISTRIBUTION AND RESTORATION OF BASIC 
SERVICES......................................................................................................44 
1. Chile ....................................................................................................44 
2. Haiti.....................................................................................................44 
D.  INFRASTRUCTURE ....................................................................................45 
1. Chile ....................................................................................................45 
2. Haiti.....................................................................................................46 
E. INFORMATION NETWORKS ...................................................................46 
1. Chile ....................................................................................................46 
2. Haiti.....................................................................................................47 
F. CHAPTER SUMMARY................................................................................48 
V. CONCLUSIONS ........................................................................................................51 
A. CONCLUSIONS ............................................................................................51 
APPENDIX. DONOR CONTRIBUTIONS AND PLEDGES TO CHILE IN 
RESPONSE TO THE FEBRUARY 27, 2010 EARTHQUAKE ............................55 
LIST OF REFERENCES......................................................................................................57 
INITIAL DISTRIBUTION LIST .........................................................................................61 
 
 ix
LIST OF FIGURES 
Figure 1. The dynamics of a conflict episode (From:  Pondy, 1967, p. 306)....................6 
Figure 2. Operational NGOs grouped by annual budget size (From: Harvey et al., 
2010, p. 20) ......................................................................................................16 
Figure 3. Civil-Military Operations Center Functions (From: CJCS, 2009, p. II–22)....21 
Figure 4. Map of Chile (From:  Maps.com) ....................................................................26 
Figure 5. Regions Affected by Chilean Earthquake (From: U.N. OCHA as cited in 
Beittel & Margesson, 2010).............................................................................28 
Figure 6. Map of Haiti (From: Maps.com)......................................................................32 
Figure 7. Map of Haiti Earthquake Affected Areas (From: USAID, 2010)....................34 
 
 x
THIS PAGE INTENTIONALLY LEFT BLANK 
 
 xi
LIST OF ACRONYMS AND ABBREVIATIONS 
CIA Central Intelligence Agency  
CRS Congressional Research Service 
 
DART Disaster Assistance Response Team  
 
FAO Food and Agricultural Organization 
FEMA Federal Information Management Agency 
 
GDP/PPP Gross Domestic Product at Purchasing Power Parity 
GoC Government of Chile 
GoH Government of Haiti 
 
HCT United Nations Humanitarian Country Team  
 
IGO International Governmental Organization 
ILO International Labor Organization 
IOM European Union and International Organization for Migration 
 
JTF- Haiti Joint Task Force-Haiti 
 
MINUSTAH United Nations Stabilization Mission to Haiti   
 
NGO Non-Governmental Organization  
 
OCHA United Nations Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian 
Affairs 
ODI Office of Overseas Development Institute, United Kingdom  
OFDA Office of Foreign Disaster Assistance 
OHCR Office of High Commissioner for Human Rights 
ONEMI Chilean National Emergency Office (Oficina Nacional de 
Emergencia–Ministerio del Interior) 
 
PAHO Pan-American Health of Organizations 
 
U.K. United Kingdom  
U.N. United Nations  
UNDP United Nations Development Program 
UNICEF United Nations Children Funds 
UNESCO United Nations Educational, Scientific, and Cultural Organization 




USG United States Government 
USGS United States Geological Survey  




We extend our greatest gratitude to professors and advisors Professors Powley 
and Apte for their patience, flexibility, and guidance with our project. Without a doubt, 
their assistance, support, and continuous encouragement were instrumental when it was 
difficult to move forward.  Lastly, we would like to thank the Naval Postgraduate School 
Dudley Knox Library’s staff for their support and their expertise in the research of data 
and information needed to put this MBA Professional Report together.     
Victor Allende and Jorge Anaya 
 
I would like to extend my heartfelt gratitude to my dear parents, Victor Sr. and 
Maria, my sisters, Lisbeth and Irene, my friends, the Faith Bible Church family in Fallon, 
Nevada, and the Grace Bible Church family in Hollister, California for their unwavering 
support, incessant prayers, and continuous encouragement in this endeavor.  Finally, to 
my advisors, Professors Apte and Powley, I sincerely appreciate your passion for 
education, for teaching, and the care you have provided me in the classroom and outside 
the classroom throughout the development of this MBA Professional Report.    
Victor Allende 
 
I would like to thank my advisors, Professors Powley and Apte, who showed 
enormous patience and encouragement.  I will always remember, “a writer writes, 
always.”  Secondly, I would like to thank my instructors and fellow students at NPS who 
made my time in Monterey so immensely rewarding.  Next, I would like to thank the 
many people I have come across in the Navy who mentored me and believed in me more 
than I did in myself.  I wish to specifically note Captain Jon “Notso” Albright as an 
inspiration, and my project partner, LCDR Victor Allende, for never giving up on me.  
Lastly, I would like to thank my parents, Jose and Maria, and sister Susana for their 








Based on the available evidence to date, it appears that 
the tragedy in Haiti is largely a function of disorganized 
hierarchal structure of authority and decision-making by overseers; 
this reflects poor international leadership and ineffective 
Inter-agency coordination  
-Piotrowski, 2010, p. 110 
 
Seeking to end squabbling over the government’s 
performance…Enough with pointing fingers. The main  
problem is helping the people 
 -President Michelle Bachelet, CBS News Network, 2010 
 
Good governance cannot prevent a catastrophic disaster,  
but it can help prepare for and respond to one 
-U.S. Senate Hearing Committee, 2010, p. 6 
 
A. BACKGROUND 
Large-scale disasters, such as hurricanes, earthquakes, floods, volcanic eruptions, 
test the competence of those in positions of authority and power in organizing aid to 
those affected.  A disaster defined by the Federal Emergency Management Agency 
(FEMA) is an event that causes 100 deaths or 100 human injuries or damage worth U.S. 
$1 million (Apte, 2009, p. 6).  A more systematic definition of a disaster provided by 
Kent (1987) emphasizes a disaster event as an occurrence of underlying causes and 
agents that expose the vulnerability of a group in a way that lives, economic and social 
structures are threatened or harmed, survival imperiled, and outside assistance required 
(p. 4).  
A large-scale disaster requires the cooperation of many organizations, 
international and domestic.  As Apte (2009) notes, humanitarian efforts have increased 
since the devastation of the Indian Ocean tsunami in 2004 with marked economic and 
humanitarian consequences (p. 3).  Cooperation begs the questions of the origins, 
avenues, structures, and composition of humanitarian aid as the results significantly 
affect the response of the humanitarian effort, especially within the first critical days.  
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Humans, being social creatures by nature, cooperate to find ways to connect, collaborate, 
and develop strong positive relationships to weather the storms and crises, despite 
potential differences. Actors come together and cooperate in difficult situations; however, 
they also fall short of achieving cohesion and togetherness (Svedin, 2009, p. 4).   
Thus, what are cooperation and collaboration?  Panitz (1996) defines 
collaboration as “a philosophy of interaction and personal lifestyle where individuals are 
responsible for their actions, including learning and respect the abilities and contributions 
of their peers; and for cooperation is a structure of interaction designed to facilitate the 
accomplishment of a specific end product or goal through people working together in 
groups” (p. 1).  Ultimately, cooperation and collaboration are the underlying foundation 
for interpersonal and organizational relationships between individuals and groups, and 
the determinant of success in providing humanitarian assistance in a timely and efficient 
manner. 
B. OBJECTIVE 
The objective of this project is to examine the relationships that occur during 
collaboration and cooperation amongst multiple agents (government, military, non-
governmental) in the immediate aftermath of major natural catastrophes requiring the 
deployment of extensive humanitarian relief efforts.  Specifically, the process of 
collaboration and the formation of interagency relationships and the effect on the 
humanitarian supply chain’s efficiency in providing aid immediately in devastated areas 
and the creation of positive social relationships that spur the process of healing and 
recovery amongst local populations and aid providers. 
1. Scope  
This report examines two recent cases, the earthquakes of Chile and Haiti, in 
order to analyze the factors involved in the collaborative and cooperative aspects of 
multiple agencies in providing humanitarians logistics.  Furthermore, the interest area is 
the sensitivity and responsiveness of collaboration in aid deployment once the 
requirement for aid is identified until the initial few hours and days after aid arrives in the 
affected areas.  What are the prerequisites for collaboration between partners, especially 
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partners that may have different objectives and priorities, that will facilitate the care and 
assistance of affected areas?  What else is required to be present in the administration of 
care that will spur healing and recovery? 
2. Benefits of Study 
The primary benefit of this project is to understand if healing and recovery are 
more likely to be achieved when partnerships between humanitarian providers in the aid 
supply chain are collaborative and founded on positive social relations. Also, the intent of 
this project is not just to provide an understanding, but an appreciation for the depth of 
these relationships since major disasters are quite natural but yet unexpected at times, 
with little or no warning at all; such was the case for Chile and Haiti.  With military 
organizations having an increasing role in providing aid, and the involvement of non-
governmental organizations as specialists in disaster relief, these relationships have a 
large effect on the ability and success of a humanitarian operation in providing relief 
efficiently in terms of time, money and lives.  Often the same conflicts occur time and 
again resulting in wasted efforts ‘reinventing the wheel’ and protecting organizational 
interests instead of expending energies in providing aid. 
C. ORGANIZATION AND METHODOLOGY 
This project contains data gathered from a literature review that includes recent 
articles, cases, and books.  Chapter II provides a detailed literature review from the 
humanitarian logistics domain that includes disaster and crisis management, logistics, 
inter-organizational and cross cultural collaboration, and positive social interaction.  
Chapter III provides country case literature for Haiti and Chile.  Chapter IV provides a 
cross case comparison between the earthquakes in Chile and Haiti to uncover critical 
themes related to the deployment of assistance and point of specific lessons learned for 
future logistical support following major disasters.  Furthermore, it includes similarities 
and differences between both nations in handling their respective crises.  Chapter V 
wraps up the project with conclusions and recommendations for future research. 
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II. LITERATURE REVIEW 
A. INTRODUCTION 
The literature review is organized to present the concepts of humanitarian 
logistics, organizational behavioral concepts, and the structure of the modern 
humanitarian relief system.  These sources provide the framework for the cross case 
analysis between Haiti and Chile in regards to collaboration and healing with respects to 
humanitarian aid and logistics efforts.   
B. CONCEPTUAL FRAMEWORK LITERATURE 
1.  Organizational Conflict 
In Organizational Conflict: Concepts and Models, Pondy provides a method of 
analysis for observing and examining conflict in organizations.  First, Pondy (1967) 
defines conflict as a “dynamic process” or a continuum of “conflict episodes” defined by 
“conditions characterized by certain potentials” (p. 299).  Every interaction between 
individuals affects subsequent interactions that in total manifest in “stable aspects of 
conditions, affect, perception and behavior” (Pondy, 1967, p. 299). 
Pondy (1967) describes five stages of a conflict episode. 
• Latent conflict (conditions) 
• Perceived conflict (cognition) 
• Felt conflict (affect) 
• Manifest conflict (behavior) 
• Conflict aftermath (conditions) (pp. 300–305) 
Pondy (1967) explains that each conflict episode is a sequence of many episodes that 
form the substance of relationships among individuals within the organization (p. 305).  
However, these episodes, besides being the foundation for further conflict episodes, are 
also affected by outside environmental factors that form new conflict episodes, or affect 





Figure 1.   The dynamics of a conflict episode (From:  Pondy, 1967, p. 306) 
Pondy’s (1967) focus on conflict within organizations is based on the implications 
of performance of the organization with respects to productivity (how much does the 
organization make), stability (how cohesive and solvent is the organization), and 
adaptability (how much can the organization change) (p. 308).  Therefore, conflict should 
be viewed as “functional or dysfunctional…[as] it facilitates or inhibits the organization’s 
productivity, stability or adaptability” (Pondy, 1967, p. 308).  Conflict can create a 
“disequilibrium” that in the end may force resolution, dissolution, or tolerance of 
persistent conflict dependent on the “contributions” and “inducements” that individuals 
receive from the relationship (Pondy, 1967, p. 312). 
Pondy (1967) provides three conceptual models in which to analyze 
organizational conflict:  bargaining model (used when parties have problems of 
competition); bureaucratic model (used when parties have problems of control); and a 
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systems model (used when parties have problems of coordination) (p. 317).  Analysis of 
conflict is rarely a pure version of one of the three models; however, a systems model 
presents a framework in which to view issues of collaboration.  Pondy states that the 
source of conflict in such situations is the “pressures toward suboptimization” in goal-
oriented groups with different priorities for a same set of goals.  The potential for conflict 
may exist in this situation if there are sub-units that are functionally interdependent, yet 
have different prioritizations for the same goals, or different goals altogether (Pondy, 
1967, p. 318).  There are two solutions for conflict reduction in these relationships:  
reducing goal differentiation by modifying incentive systems, or proper selection, 
training and assignment procedures, reducing functional interdependence by decreasing 
common resources, introducing buffers, or lowering of consensus pressures (Pondy, 
1967, p. 318).  Pondy (1967) cautions that these techniques in conflict prevention may 
have significant direct and indirect costs (p. 318). 
2. Organizational Cooperation in Crises 
Svedin (2009) notes that crises are often managed in an “inter-organizational 
way” with the requirement of a clear command structure or “cooperation among 
horizontally organized actors” (p. 1). Organizational Cooperation in Crises provides a 
framework in which to analyze cooperation and collaboration in crises/crisis management 
under the assumption that the management of crises through cooperation is a way for 
inter-organizational structures to be “effective, efficient…and resilient in the face of 
threat” (Svedin, 2009, p. 1).  However, in cooperation a cruel irony or duality exists, as 
“cooperation everywhere is interspersed with and intricately connected to conflict” 
(Svedin, 2009, p. 6).  In a more detailed explanation: 
Cooperative motivations, strategies and behavior are constantly being 
balanced with, played off and interspersed with competitive and 
conflictual drivers, strategies and behaviors as organizations interact with 
one another in situations where the organizations are operating under 
pressure. (Svedin, 2009, p. 6) 
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Svedin (2009) believes that by understanding cooperation and conflict as “integral and 
often co-existing complimentary parts of organizational behavior and strategies, we will 
be better able to understand the underlying dynamics of organizational crisis 
interactions;” thereby, understanding in which conditions cooperation or conflict will 
arise, and what measures will strengthen cooperation and weaken competition/conflictual 
sentiments (p. 6). 
At the end of Svedin’s research in crisis cooperation, the following general 
conclusions are presented. 
• “Cooperation and conflict in organizational interactions are intrinsically 
linked in crises” and “a mix of cooperative and competitive actions” are 
used to achieve their desired objectives. 
• “A majority of the interactions between organizations in crises, both in 
decision-making situations and over the course of a crisis, are conflictual.  
That is, organizations interacting in crises tend to disagree, fight and 
engage in other competitive behavior to a greater extent than they agree, 
are honest toward each other, or help each other….a majority of the 
behavior types displayed in decision-making situations  can be 
characterized as competitive or conflictual.” 
• “The overarching crisis cooperation strategies demonstrate the complexity 
of organizational interactions in crises.  All the strategies contain some 
mix of cooperative, less cooperative, and competitive behaviors” (Svedin, 
2009, pp. 125–126).  
Ultimately, an outline of tools for managing crisis cooperation is presented. 
• “Adapting the design of the interaction forum or the inter-organizational 
structure to meet the characteristics and needs of the situation” (Svedin, 
2009, p. 133). 
• “Process adaptation” in where the “processes involved in organizational 
interactions” are developed with “appropriate rules to govern how the 
group makes decisions” (Svedin, 2009, p. 134). 
• The structuring agency in where initiative and leadership are framed in 
cooperative ways to influence strategy and behavior of other 
organizations, fostering a “shared sense of responsibility and common 
destiny” (Svedin, 2009, p. 134).  
3. Anatomy of Disaster Relief 
Kent’s (1987) book, Anatomy of Disaster Relief:  The International Network in 
Action, offers insight into the history and formation of the international relief network 
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with emphasis on the cultural norms formation of modern humanitarian organizations 
that have their roots in the aftermath and search for identity and mission in the post 
World War II/Cold War period after European reconstruction (pp. 36–39).  Kent (1987) 
paints a picture of the rise of the United Nations as International Governmental 
Organization (IGO) par excellence along with the rise of Non-Governmental 
Organizations (NGO) that sought to involve themselves in the international 
relief/development effort.  The thrust of Kent’s analysis is one of networks and the 
organizational dynamics between agents in the international aid network in providing 
effective relief to include “1) politics and the priority formulation process; 2) perceptions 
and persuasive communications; 3) organizational behavior; 4) inter-organizational 
relations” (Kent, 1987, p. 117).   
In all, Kent’s book serves as a primer on the basics of organizational behavior in 
the total international relief network.   
4. Humanitarian Logistics 
Apte (2009) presents in the monograph, Humanitarian Logistics:  A New Field of 
Research and Action, an overview of the field of humanitarian logistics as a new field of 
study (p. 1).  The monograph is structured in six sections, which entail a comprehensive 
review and definition of humanitarian logistics, design factors using standard supply 
chain management principles, organizational issues within the humanitarian supply chain, 
analytical models, and academic research in current and recent operations (Apte, 2009, 
pp. 4–5).   
Apte’s monograph presents a comprehensive examination on the subject of 
humanitarian logistics used as a springboard for the rest of this project.  Section 5 of the 
monograph, “Organizational Issues in Humanitarian Logistics,” provides background on 
the organizational issues identified as factors during operations, with a major one being 
the issue of “collaboration among players” being highlighted (Apte, 2009, p. 66).  
Literature in the field identifies collaboration amongst organizational entities, to include 
“military, private and humanitarian sectors,” and the local population involved in relief 
operations as a factor in the effectiveness (Apte, 2009, p. 67).  However, an impediment 
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to this effectiveness is the challenges and differences in organizational culture between 
civilians and the military, a lack of established “military doctrine and training in 
humanitarian relief operations,” and barriers in communication/information transmission 
(Apte, 2009, pp. 67–68). 
5. Healing Communities in Conflict 
In Healing Communities in Conflict:  International Assistance in Complex 
Emergencies, Maynard (1999) describes that the international community possesses “a 
limited perspective” in reacting to complex emergencies in foreign interventions (pp. x–
xi).  Maynard describes the frequent action for these complex emergencies are marked by 
“fast response [and] short term approaches” that are “short-sighted…lacking conceptual 
depth,” setting the stage for continued conflict upon the end of humanitarian assistance 
(Maynard, 1999, p. xi).  While the focus is on relief actions in the realm of conflict 
scenarios, a humanitarian focus is inherent in the actions in healing communities 
recovering from hostilities, and therefore, applicable to natural disasters. 
Maynard (1999) describes four large areas in which international relief operations 
tend to fall short in being effective: 1) a focus on treating the outward manifestations of 
conflict vice the sources of conflict; 2) a narrow focus on single actions vice an integrated 
solution on multiple fronts; 3) limited range of disciplines utilized in response; and 4) 
restricted discussion vertically and horizontally within and amongst organizations that 
has an effect on field level activities (pp. xi–xiii).  These issues have their origin in a 
“lack of scope [and] vision” in regards to “time span, range of disciplines, spectrum of 
situational factors, and lack of input from field practitioners, policy makers, senior 
organizational staff, and academia” (Maynard, 1999, p. xiv).  Ultimately, Maynard 
(1999) contends that the international relief network needs to develop “an operational 
strategy based on a long-term perspective that will direct the collective will toward the 
most appropriate action leading to a self-sustaining peace” (p. xiv).  Broadly, Maynard 
structures her treatise by analyzing the issues involved in international assistance 
following up with possible methods in addressing them.   
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Maynard’s approach and analysis of international humanitarian assistance in 
complex emergencies is unique in that a primary focus is made via a multidisciplinary 
approach on efforts during and after relief aid, with an emphasis on collaboration, 
cohesion, community formation, healing and rehabilitation (Maynard, 1999, pp. xvi–
xviii).  This is in stark contrast with many analyses of aid where the predominant view 
and concern is a model of the transport and delivery of aid with little afterthought of the 
long-term mission after a disaster or crisis.  Maynard emphasizes a long-term solution, 
which is often overlooked and avoided by many international relief agents who seem to 
focus on efficiency, effectiveness and expeditiousness.  This long-term solution requires 
a much more formalized system than the voluntary collaborative methods currently 
utilized (Maynard, 1999, p. 200).  Maynard argues for a systems approach that considers 
the issues of scope, time frame, preparedness, and coordination focused on the larger 
picture of aid before and beyond disasters (Maynard, 1999, pp. 200–201).  Her 
recommendations for improvement of the humanitarian system involve the definition of 
aid to be based on mandates that supersede the specific organizational focuses that define 
humanitarian actors, yet are defined accordingly to provide a division of labor as to 
prevent confusion amongst actors (Maynard, 1999, pp. 206–207).  Another 
recommendation is the changing of funding mechanisms that create adverse incentives of 
“interagency competition, delay response, reduce continuity, and limit…organizational 
development” (Maynard, 1999, p. 207).  Maynard also advocates a regional focus that 
utilizes local capacities and regional institutions to address issues within a region, beyond 
geographic and operational limitations that currently frame operations (Maynard, 1999, p. 
208).  Lastly, improved information sharing is identified as a necessity as it corresponds 
to a requirement for “better intra and inter-organizational information sharing” that will 
influence “data collection, information sharing, response coordination, strategy 
development, contextualization, and standardization” (Maynard, 1999, p. 209). 
6. Organizational Healing 
Powley and Cameron (2006) in Organizational Healing: Lived Virtuousness 
Amidst Organizational Crisis, present a model that seeks to describe the process of 
organizational healing in the wake of a rupture of personal and organizational continuity, 
 12
relationships, perceptions and expectations that threaten “the core values and social fabric 
of the organization” (p. 14).  Healing is defined as the work of an organization in 
“repairing and mending the collective social fabric…after some threat or shock to its 
system” and is a manifestation of the capacity that exists in the “collective identity, 
values, processes, and culture of an organization” to “facilitate and demonstrate 
virtuousness at the collective level,” allowing an organization to return to a “healthy state 
of functioning” (Powley & Cameron, 2006, pp. 13–15).  This capacity is a collective 
effort of specific actions and interactions coordinated by individuals within the 
organization, to restore “harmony, security, and integrity” (Powley & Cameron, 2006, p. 
16).  Powley and Cameron state that organizational healing occurs in the aftermath of 
trauma within a liminal space where existing social structures are suspended and actors 
engage in actions that support the rebuilding and renewal of organizational social fabric, 
continuity, expectations, and identity (Powley & Cameron, 2006, p 16).  Powley and 
Cameron state that the extent of occurrence of virtuous actions within this liminal space 
indicates the potential of healing within the organization (Powley & Cameron, 2006, p. 
17).   
Powley and Cameron identify four themes as a reflection of an organization’s 
capacity for virtuousness: reinforcing the priority of the individual, fostering high quality 
connections, strengthening a family culture, and initiating ceremonies and rituals (Powley 
& Cameron, 2006, p. 13). The first of these themes, reinforcing the priority of the 
individual, organizational actors reorient themselves to the core purposes of the 
organization by re-centering thoughts and actions focused on those purposes (Powley & 
Cameron, 2006, p. 23).  The second theme, fostering high quality connections, refers to 
the extent that organizational actors deliberately create deep personal connections with 
others in the system (Powley & Cameron, 2006, p. 23).  These connections, characterized 
as virtuous and high quality, help to maintain and form cohesive groups and teams 
offering the opportunity to strengthen and develop personal bonds with others (Powley & 
Cameron, 2006, p. 23).  The third theme, strengthening a family culture, enabled the 
sharing of experience that reinforces member’ common bonds with another revealing 
already established virtuous patterns of interaction, caring and concern embedded cultural 
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attributes in organizations but only manifesting themselves in the wake of trauma and 
crisis (Powley & Cameron, 2006, pp. 25–26).  The final theme, initiating ceremonies and 
rituals, allow organizational actors a space for interaction and virtuousness to facilitate 
the establishment of common bonds and organizational wholeness, resulting in actors 
regrouping, re-identifying and reorienting themselves to the organization (Powley & 
Cameron, 2006, p. 27). 
Powley and Cameron conclude collective actions, messages delivered by 
organizational representatives, and planned communal activities supplemented by 
individual actions, facilitate organizational healing.  The more virtuousness these actions, 
especially when undertaken within the opportunity to pursue new approaches and 
relationships afforded by liminal spaces, the more effective the production of desired 
healing within the organization (Powley & Cameron, 2006, p. 29).  This is in contrast to 
the alternative of organizational “threat rigidity” in which organizational actors can 
display “self protective responses, blame others, become critical and cynical, refuse to 
share information, and lose confidence in leaders” (Powley & Cameron, 2006, p. 30).  
Powley and Cameron state that virtue in social relationships and connections within 
organizations is what holds organizations together in the face of crisis (Powley & 
Cameron, 2006, p. 30).  By adopting a strategy of virtuous response, the competency and 
inclination to heal will exist and reside within an organization’s culture and capacity 
(Powley & Cameron, 2006, p. 30).  
C. THE MODERN HUMANITARIAN SYSTEM 
1. Introduction 
The international humanitarian movement has its antecedent in the founding of 
the Red Cross movement in 1863 by J. Henry Dunant, after he witnessed the realities of 
the casualties suffered by soldiers at the Battle of Solferino in 1859 (Kent, 1987, p. 34).  
The genesis of this international movement spurred national movements in individual 
nations, as well as the Geneva Convention of 1864 that still is a cornerstone of 
international law (Kent, 1987, p. 34).  In the aftermath of World War II, Kent describes 
how the modern humanitarian evolved in five distinct phases. 
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• From 1945–1950, growth in private voluntary and inter-governmental 
organizations that addressed mass disruption and distress in post-World 
War II Europe (Kent, 1987, p. 33). 
• After European stability, the pressure for relief organizations to find 
“permanent and stable roles,” many of which emphasized development 
work, over relief, of what later was defined as the Third World (Kent, 
1987, pp. 33–34). 
• In the aftermath of disasters of newly-independent states from the 1960s to 
the 1970s, Biafra, for example, a recognition of the necessity of 
specialization in disaster relief led to the development of many institutions 
along governmental, inter-governmental and non-governmental lines 
(Kent, 1987, p. 34). 
• From the 1970s–1980s, the increase of humanitarian actors led to 
significant issues with coordination.  As a result, efforts were undertaken 
to create coordination efforts that did not rely on formal frameworks 
unpopular amongst independent and decentralized actors (Kent, 1987, p. 
34). 
• From the early 1980s, the relationships between actors led to difficulties in 
forming a coherent system due to “diversity of interests and approaches” 
(Kent, 1987, p. 34). 
• An acceptance of a “plural capabilities option,” as formulated by then 
U.N. Under-Secretary for Administration and Management George 
Davidson, was a realization that rigid frameworks and hierarchies were 
not going to work, and the best possible solution involved offering “joint 
assessment procedures” that would channel actor contributions to an 
operation that prevented erosion of actor interest and sovereignty (Kent, 
1987, p. 62). 
The international relief system, never static, continues to evolve as relationships amongst 
actors develop and mature in response to disaster events. 
2. Actors 
a. Non-Governmental Organizations 
Non-governmental organization (NGOs), according to the Code of 
Conduct for the International Red Cross and Red Crescent Movement and Non-
Governmental Organizations in Disaster Relief, is an umbrella term for an organization, 
national and international constituted separately from the government of the country in 
which they are formed (Davidson, Haynes & Landon, 1996, p. 10).  Harvey, Stoddard, 
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Harmer, Taylor, DiDomenico and Brander (2010) estimate that the size in terms of 
personnel and monetary resources for an operational NGO effort is 208,000 personnel 
(113,000 in the field), and over $5.7 billion in spending spread out amongst 250 
individual groups (pp. 19–20).   
Common to NGOs is a distinct identifiable ethos fundamental to the way 
they conduct themselves.  As many of these actors were formed in the aftermath of some 
of the most bloody and costly of conflict amongst nations, the principles of 
independence, decentralization, long-term commitment to mission, and hands-on 
involvement is a common theme for all (Davidson et al., 1996, pp. 13–14). 
Despite the common sentiments that form the culture of NGOs, 
stratification and differentiation exists amongst NGOs, with resource bases, mission 
focus, and technology being determining factors in defining respective NGOs.  First, 
NGOs differ with respect to the size of their funding with the largest players having over 
$250 billion, and smaller agencies having $10 million or less (Harvey et al., 2010, p. 20).  
Origins vary, but sources are normally comprised of public grants from national donor 
governments and international organizations, to private donations from individuals, 
businesses, religious groups and the like (Davidson et al., 1996, p. 12).  Acceptance of 
resources can be affected, however, due to organizational ethos leading them to refuse 
assistance from entities they feel may compromise their organizational values (Davidson 
et al., 1996, p. 12).  However, in the end, significant competition occurs amongst all 
players for the scarce amount of funding that determines, as well as reflects, 
organizational relevancy and effectiveness in the marketplace (Kent, 1987, p. 41).  Figure 
2 provides a snapshot of different tiers of NGOs in relation to resource bases of funding 
and personnel size. 
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Figure 2.   Operational NGOs grouped by annual budget size (From: Harvey et al., 
2010, p. 20) 
Secondly, mission focus and interest serve as another fundamental construct that shape 
the orientation of NGOs.  Issues, such as human rights, conflict resolution, disease 
control, and trade, are just some of the many motivations around which NGOs orientate 
their activities (Davidson et al., 1996, p. 12).  Despite particular interests, NGOs remain 
dedicated to grass roots efforts with the end goal of developing local capacities, and 
autonomy for their affairs (Davidson et al., 2010, p. 12).  Finally, technological capacity 
serves a two-fold function: a reflection on size and operational locality of each respective 
NGO, and the priority that each organization places on technology as relevant to their 
operations (Davidson et al., 2010, p. 12).  This issue is more pronounced with smaller 
organizations that have limited resources, and as such, may prioritize assets in the form of 
in-country programs (Davidson et al., 2010, p. 12).  Technology, while useful, suffers 
from issues with commonality, obsolescence, and standardization that prevent upgrading 




organizations are of the mindset that technology offers little advantage in operational 
contexts, as they are targets of theft or suspicion, or infrastructure in affected areas may 
make operation of equipment nearly impossible (Davidson et al., 2010, p. 12). 
b. Inter-Governmental Organizations 
Inter-governmental organizations (IGOs), with the United Nations (U.N.) 
as the IGO par excellence in the modern humanitarian system, are afforded a special 
status with respect to international law, custom and convention.  When acting in response 
to an international humanitarian disaster, the U.N. is usually in the lead of the 
international response coordinating efforts with host nation concurrence and advisement 
as to the course of action. 
Identifying significant gaps and deficiencies in certain areas in 
humanitarian response, the U.N. implemented reforms to develop organizational capacity 
for a more “predictable, efficient and effective” humanitarian response vice the ad hoc 
nature that had been the norm (United Nations Office for the Coordination of 
Humanitarian Affairs [OCHA], 2006, p. 1).  The result of this reform was the creation of 
the cluster approach in which nine (later eleven) functional clusters were established to 
deal with three dimensions of aid: service provisions; relief and assistance to 
beneficiaries; and cross cutting issues (OCHA, 2006, p. 1).  The eleven functional 
clusters are as follows. 
• Logistics 
• Nutrition 
• Emergency Shelter 




• Emergency Telecommunication 





• Sanitation, Water and Hygiene 
The cluster system seeks to address issues at the strategic and operational 
levels with humanitarian stakeholders to improve collaboration and accountability by 
providing a framework for continued cooperation and interaction in addressing issues of 
preparation of disasters, and coordination when mobilized in the event of a disaster 
(OCHA, 2006, p. 2).   
c. Donors 
Donors provide aid-in-kind and financial assistance to NGO/IGOs.  Two 
major types of donors are private donors and national governments. 
Private donors take the form of charitable contributions from individual 
persons to sizable sums from corporations and charitable bodies.  Private voluntary 
contributions to NGOs serve as significant sources of funding, with some organizations 
receiving funding at levels on par with some national governments (Harvey et al., p. 22).  
NGO preference for this source of funding is due to the relative ability for use without 
conditions from donors, flexibility of use, and speed of response from donors upon 
solicitation (Harvey et al., p. 22). 
National governments serve as the largest sources of humanitarian 
funding, with the United States the largest amongst world governments (Harvey et al., p. 
22).  National government aid may be viewed with criticism by NGOs as aid at times 
having served a political dimension as a function of political policy objectives of the 
donor nation (regional security focus, stability, influence).  NGOs feel that the strings 
attached to such aid is a violation of their neutrality and independence, affecting their 
ability to proffer aid to victims in the way that the NGO sees best fit the situation. 
Within the context of the United States Government (USG), the Office of 
U.S. Foreign Disaster Assistance (OFDA), an office within the United States Agency for 
International Development (USAID), serves as the lead federal agency to “provide and 
coordinate USG humanitarian assistance in response to international emergencies and 
disasters” (OFDA, 2010a, p. 13).  OFDA expertise and capabilities put it in the unique 
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position to liaise with other federal agencies and international humanitarian actors to 
respond to disasters to fulfill its mandate to save lives, alleviate suffering and reduce the 
social and economic impact of disasters (OFDA, 2010a, p. 13).  OFDA responds to 
disasters upon the declaration of a disaster from the U.S. Ambassador or Chief of Mission 
meeting the following criteria. 
• “The magnitude of the disaster is beyond the capacity of the host country 
to respond” 
• “The host country requests, or is willing to accept, assistance” 
• “A response is in the interest of the USG” (OFDA, 2010a, p. 13) 
OFDA will then coordinate with the U.S. Embassy or USAID Mission in the affected 
nation to determine the size and scope of an appropriate response, which can take the 
form of the following. 
• “Immediate provision of up to $50,000 to the U.S. Embassy for the local 
purchase of supplies or as a contribution to a relief organization” 
• “Deployment of a Disaster Assistance Response Team (DART) or an 
emergency team to disaster-affected areas to conduct assessments, 
determine additional needs, deliver relief supplies, and/or recommend 
proposals for funding.” 
• “Activation of an on-call Response Management Team (RMT) in 
Washington, D.C.” 
• “Procurement, transportation, and distribution of emergency relief 
supplies, such as plastic sheeting, water containers water purification 
units, blankets, and health supplies, from one of OFDA’s three regional 
warehouses” 
• Support for relief and rehabilitation activities through grants to 
implementing organizations, including international and local non-
governmental organizations, U.N. agencies, or international organizations” 
(OFDA, 2010a, p. 13). 
d. Recipient Governments 
Within the context of humanitarian assistance, host nation sovereignty is 
respected and in theory, all coordination efforts are to be channeled through host nation 
prerogatives.  Host nations are to direct the size, scope, and direction of aid.  As the 
senior executive of the nation in distress, the head of country and its executive apparatus 
is responsible for the welfare of the nation. 
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e. Military 
Foreign militaries, whether as part of a U.N. mission, or as part of a larger 
humanitarian mission, have played an important part in humanitarian missions.  With the 
number and size of recent disasters, more focus has been placed on their contributions 
and the significance of their involvement in this arena.  NGOs feel that the military’s 
mission and responsibility with the context of relief missions is the assurance of security 
for NGOs to function in the distribution of aid (Davidson et al., p. 17).  However, the 
dimensions and urgency of aid distribution, which is dependent on the scope of the 
disaster, may require the use of the military as an avenue for aid distribution to affected 
populations as they are in possession of significant command and control, transportation 
and logistics capabilities.  NGOs feel that this is an encroachment within their operational 
realm and experience, or feel it is an overall drain on resources as military mobilization is 
an expensive proposition for humanitarian aid. 
Within Joint Doctrine, humanitarian missions are a subset of Civil 
Military Operations (CMO) as codified in Joint Publication 3-57.  Joint Doctrine views 
CMO as a primary military instrument to “synchronize military and non-military 
instruments of national power” and recognizes the irregular nature of such operations that 
are “inherently joint, interagency, and multinational” (Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of 
Staff [CJCS], 2008, pp. I–1 & I–2).  CMO work in the seams and gaps of “organizations, 
phases and processes” and require the use of “political bargaining, collaboration, 
consensus, and relationship building” to achieve success (CJCS, 2008, p. I–2). 
CJCS Joint Publication 3-29 (2009) Foreign Humanitarian Assistance, 
also provides doctrine and guidance specific to the utilization and structure of DoD forces 
in their employment in foreign disasters.  Explicit in doctrine is that “coordination and 
collaboration are essential in dealing” with NGOs, IGOs and other stakeholders in the 
humanitarian efforts (CJCS, 2009, p. II–1).  Within the structure of a Joint Task Force, 
doctrine advises of the wisdom of the establishment of a Civil-Military Operations Center 
(CMOC) to coordinate between the joint force, primarily with the assistance and advice 
of OFDA, and other stakeholders (CJCS, 2009, p. II–21).  Refer to Figure 3 for 
delineated functions under CMOC purview. 
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Figure 3.   Civil-Military Operations Center Functions (From: CJCS, 2009, p. II–22) 
f. Media 
The media, while not a provider of aid, has a significant effect via its 
reporting of disasters and the response of humanitarian actors.  While journalists position 
themselves on objectivity and impartiality with respects to the reporting of events, they 
can significantly impact public perception, which can affect and shape aid and relief 
efforts as they unfold. 
3. Failures of Inter-Agency Cooperation and Opportunities for 
Improvement 
Davidson, Hayes and Landon (1996) present findings from the workshop report, 
Humanitarian and Peace Operations:  NGOs and the Military in the Interagency 
Process, describing the military/NGO interface within the interagency process in  
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responding to humanitarian emergencies.  In their findings, the following themes were 
found to be problems in the then current relationship, and which tend to reappear in 
subsequent literature. 
a. Planning/Training 
NGOs feel that planning efforts from the United States and U.N. are 
unclear in objectives due to the aversion of planners to define specific and concrete goals 
(Davidson et al., p. 27).  Agencies tend to avoid definitive benchmarks to allow 
themselves flexibility to adjust the response in regards to political dimensions in the 
domestic and international arenas (Davidson et al., p. 27).  However, this avoidance 
results in a lack of real planning amongst civilian and military agencies that trickles down 
to NGOs as they no longer have input into this process (Davidson et al., p. 27).  NGOs 
contend that their contributions are frequently solicited only after military planners have 
already made decisions (Davidson et al., p. 29).  On the military side, the number and 
variety of NGO actors, each with their own unique and independent nature, complicates 
efforts to coordinate any effective planning effectively (Davidson et al., p. 29). 
b. Coordination 
Ongoing coordination while executing aid is difficult due to a lack of 
standardization in regards to assessing performance (Davidson et al., p. 30).  Each NGO 
may have different views in regards to what is important as to objectives and aims, which 
are grounded in organizational cultures particular to each.  As such, many organizations 
are hesitant to adopt a standardized framework that is imposed on them, leading to turf 
battles (Davidson et al., pp. 30–31). 
c. Communication 
Problems with communication are complicated at many levels.  Actors 
may be precluded from the use of technology due to interoperability dictated by issues of 
access, interoperability amongst actors, and host nation sensitivities (Davidson et al., p. 
32).   
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Another dimension that Tomassini and Wassenhove discuss is the issue of 
barriers to knowledge sharing amongst organizations.  Information sharing amongst 
actors is difficult due to the cultural values of knowledge within organizations, which 
may view that transmission as a threat due to unknown costs/possibilities of erosion of 
organizational status/ideological sacred cows that create inertia (Tomassini & 
Wassenhove, 2009, pp. 128–129). 
d. Leadership 
In a most recent study on the status of the humanitarian system, a common 
refrain from many actors was the lack of effective leadership and coordination (Harvey et 
al., 2010, p. 49).  Many of the issues identified as pressing issues have been identified 
issues for decades, with literature evidencing these issues since the beginning of the 
modern humanitarian movement.  Effective leadership is required to transcend and 
overcome the reluctance of organizations to extend beyond themselves and orient 
towards a more coordinated system. 
D. CHAPTER SUMMARY 
This chapter provided the conceptual frameworks of organizational conflict and 
collaboration utilized to analyze the interactions of actors in crisis/conflict scenarios.  
Also discussed are the concepts of humanitarian logistics and the structure of the modern 
humanitarian system, to include the actors and mechanisms of cooperation, as well as 
identified deficiencies with the current system. 
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III. COUNTRY CASE LITERATURE 
A. INTRODUCTION 
Major natural disasters around the globe are a reality that underlines humanity’s 
vulnerability regardless of technological or societal station.  However, nations benefit 
from developed infrastructure while others manage precariously on systems and 
institutions that function marginally, if at all.  Geographical topology, land area, 
population growth, Gross Domestic Product at Purchasing Power Parity (GDP/PPP), 
labor force, communications, and transportation are important considerations in 
evaluating a nation’s strength and ability to survive calamity to include a major natural 
disaster.  Furthermore, internal infrastructure and political institutions have a significant 
effect on the promptness and self-sufficiency with respects to recovery.  In January and 
February 2010, Haiti and Chile, respectively, suffered major earthquakes that destroyed 
or disrupted population areas, requiring significant humanitarian intervention efforts from 
within and from international partners to assuage the suffering of affected peoples.  
Before continuing to discuss the nature and effect of domestic infrastructure on 
humanitarian responses, it is necessary to note the differences between this project’s 
subject nations, Chile and Haiti.  
B. CHILE 
1. Country Information 
Chile is considered one the most modern nations in South America.  Chile (see 
Figure 4) is a nation with a total area of 292,260 sq mi (756,950 sq km), a total 
population (2009 est.) of 16,746,491, a population density of 21 persons per sq km, a 
growth rate of 0.8 percent, a birth rate of 14.4/1000, an infant mortality rate of 7.5/1000, 
and a life expectancy of 77.5 years.  Chile’s largest city is Santiago with a population of 
5,333,100 (metro. area) and 4,372,800 (city proper).  Other major cities are Viña del Mar, 
(population 303,100), Valparaíso (population 274,100), Talcahuano (population 





Figure 4.   Map of Chile (From:  Maps.com) 
Current Growth Domestic Product/at Purchase Powering Parity (GDP/PPP) is 
about $243.7 billion, with a per capita of $14,700.  Chile’s real growth rate is –1.7 
percent, the inflation rate 1.7 percent, and the unemployment rate 10 percent.  Arable 
land is 3 percent of the total area with agriculture composed of grapes, apples, pears, 
onions, wheat, corn, oats, peaches, garlic, asparagus, beans, beef, poultry, wool, fish, and 
timber. The labor force totals 6.3 million people with a distribution as follows: 
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agriculture 13.6 percent, industry 23.4 percent, and services 63 percent.  Major industries 
include copper, other minerals, foodstuffs, fish processing, iron and steel, wood and 
wood products, transport equipment, cement, and textiles. Natural resources comprise 
copper, timber, iron ore, nitrates, precious metals, molybdenum, and hydropower.  
Exports total $48.8 billion in copper, fruit, fish products, paper and pulp, chemicals, and 
wine.  Imports total $40.91 billion in petroleum and petroleum products, chemicals, 
electrical and telecommunications equipment, industrial machinery, vehicles, and natural 
gas.  Major trading partners are the United States, Japan, China, South Korea, 
Netherlands, Brazil, Italy, Mexico, and Argentina. 
Communications infrastructure includes telephones, of which 3.436 million are 
main lines and 10.57 million are mobile cellular phones.  Radio broadcast stations 
comprise 180 AM (eight inactive), 64 FM, and 17 shortwave (one inactive). There are 63 
television broadcast stations in addition to 121 repeaters.  Internet hosts amount to 
506,055 with 6.7 million Internet users.  Finally, in regards to transportation, the railways 
total 6,585 km, the highways 79,605 km, and the waterways 725 km. There are 16,080 
km of paved roads, and  63,525 km of unpaved roads. Ports and harbors include 
Antofagasta, Arica, Huasco, Iquique, Lirquen, San Antonio, San Vicente, Valparaíso and 
36 airports. 
2. Chilean Earthquake Sequence of Events 
At 3:30 am local time on Saturday, February 27, 2010, an 8.8 magnitude 
earthquake struck Chile with an epicenter centering on Chile’s second largest city, 
Concepción (USGS, 2010a).  According to a Congregational Research Service (CRS) 
report, over 100 aftershocks of magnitude 5.0 or greater were recorded initially after the 
major temblor (Beittel & Margesson, 2010, p. 1).  Approximately 20 minutes after the 
earthquake, a tsunami generated by the force of the shake struck the coast creating more 
destruction in various port cities south of epicenter. 
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Figure 5.   Regions Affected by Chilean Earthquake (From: U.N. OCHA as cited in 
Beittel & Margesson, 2010) 
As preliminary reports began to arrive, the Government of Chile (GoC) began to 
assess the situation. President Bachelet issued a “state of catastrophe” on 28 February for 
six regions affected by the earthquake: Valparaíso, Metropolitana, O’Higgins, Maule, 
Bio-Bio, and Araucanía (shown in Figure 5).  According to an AON Benfield report 
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(2010), the GoC and the Chile’s National Institute of Statistics estimated over 4.5 million 
households, of which at least 1.5 million were affected by the earthquake (p. 8).  
With infrastructure severely damaged, and reports of looting and violence, 
President Bachelet ordered military leadership to take control of the affected areas; 
however, that order came 48 hours after the earthquake (Radio Cooperativa, 2010).  
Concepción mayor Jacqueline van Rysselberghe warned GoC officials in Santiago of the 
potential for severe social tension, “we need food for the population. We are without 
supplies and if we don’t resolve that we are going to have serious security problems” 
(BBC News, 2010).  El Mercurio, a Chilean newspaper, reported that military 
commanders, in consultation with both Minister of Interior and Defense, declared a 
curfew for the city of Concepción, and extended martial jurisdiction to the regions of 
Bio-Bio and Maule (El Mercurio, 2010).  The GoC did not initially request foreign 
assistance; however, President Bachelet later released a statement accepting foreign aid 
but asked countries to defer until further assessment was made by her administration 
(Center for Excellence in Disaster Management & Humanitarian Assistance, 2010, p. 2).  
According to Beittel and Margesson (2010), the GoC took the lead in relief operations 
and coordinated all efforts with 16,000 Chilean military personnel providing 
humanitarian assistance and relief efforts after President Bachelet authorized military 
action to provide relief efforts and re-establish public order (Beittel & Margesson, 2010, 
p. 1). 
According to the People’s Daily, on March 1, 2010, the GoC officially requested 
international humanitarian relief aid (People’s Daily, 2010).  To organize an emergency 
response effort and reconstruction, the GoC established two committees with minister-
level designate heads, the Emergency Committee and the Reconstruction Committee, 
both under the Ministry of Interior.  Their responsibilities entailed the coordination of 
efforts with the U.N., non-governmental organizations (NGOs), and foreign 
organizations. The U.N. deployed a team to Santiago immediately after the earthquake, 
lead by the Economic Commission of Latin America and the Caribbean, to begin to work 
with the GoC.  The U.N. team included the following agencies. 
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• The U.N. Development Program (UNDP): An organization advocating for 
change and connecting countries to knowledge, experience and resources 
to help people build a better life. 
• The U.N. Children’s Fund (UNICEF): A global humanitarian relief 
organization providing children with health care, clean water, nutrition, 
education, and emergency relief. 
• The Office of the High Commissioner for Human Rights (OHCR): An 
organization that oversees major programs in protecting human rights and 
implementing international rights agreements. 
• The Pan-American Health Organization (PAHO): An international public 
health agency with the mission to improve health and living standards of 
the countries of the Americas. 
• The U.N. Educational, Scientific, and Cultural Organizations (UNESCO): 
An organization that contributes to the building of peace, the eradication 
of poverty, sustainable development and intercultural dialogue through 
education, the sciences, culture, communication and information. 
• The Food and Agricultural Organization (FAO): An organization that 
assists developing countries and countries in transition to modernize and 
improve agriculture, forestry and fisheries practices and ensure good 
nutrition for all. 
• The International Labor Organization (ILO):  An organization devoted to 
advancing opportunities for women and men to obtain decent and 
productive work in conditions of freedom, equity, security and human 
dignity. 
• The European Union and International Organization for Migration (IOM): 
An IGO responsible for the coordination of migration issues.  Working 
with governmental, inter-governmental, and non-governmental actors, 
IOM seeks to promote humane and orderly migration, as well as assisting 
refugees and internally displaced persons due to humanitarian disaster 
(Beittel & Margesson, 2010, p. 8). 
After the GoC contacted the U.N. Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian 
Assistance Organization (OCHA), officials within the government made targeted 
requests, such as communication equipment (e.g., radios), field hospitals, and water 
purifications devices. Apart from OCHA coordinating with government officials, there 
were other humanitarian actors as well.  Various NGOs were also involved, such as the 
following. 
• The American Red Cross 
• The British Red Cross 
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• Caritas International, Catholic Charity 
• Children International 
• Médecins Sans Frontières (MSF) 
• Organization (MERLIN) 
• Oxfam International  
• Save the Children (SC)      
• Telecom Sans Frontières (TSF) 
As emergency funds and equipment poured in, humanitarian assistance teams 
began to coordinate their efforts under the leadership of the GoC.  On February 27, the 
United States Government (USG) activated a Response Management Team (RMT), 
under the auspices of the United States Agency for International Development 
(USAID)/Office of Foreign Disaster Assistance (OFDA).  The OFDA Response 
Management Team, headquartered in Washington, DC, was established to coordinate the 
USG response to Chile’s earthquake.  On February 28, U.S. Ambassador Paul E. 
Simmons released a disaster declaration in response to the effects of the earthquake and 
after consultation with the GoC.  Upon receipt of this declaration from the U.S. Embassy 
in Chile, USAID deployed a 16-member Disaster Assistance Response Team (DART) 
that, once in country, began to coordinate with local officials within the GoC in the 
delivery of emergency relief commodities (OFDA, 2010c,).  The Appendix illustrates a 
non-exhaustive list of countries that have collaborated in providing humanitarian aid 
relief since March 1, 2010 when the GoC officially requested foreign humanitarian 
assistance.  
Observers give President Bachelet’s government high marks for its steady 
response in light of the earthquake’s magnitude, as well as maintaining the orderly 
transfer of power to the incoming administration of then President-elect Sebastian Piñera 




1. Country Information 
Haiti’s total land area (see Figure 6) covers 10,714 sq mi (27,750 sq km), with a 
population (2009 est.) of 9,035,536, a growth rate of 1.8 percent, a birth rate of 
29.1/1000, an infant mortality rate of 59.7/1000, a life expectancy rate of 60.7, and a 
population density of 323 people per sq km.  The capital and largest city is Port-au-Prince 
with a population of 1,764,000 in the metropolitan area and 1,119,000 in the city proper. 
 
 
Figure 6.   Map of Haiti (From: Maps.com) 
Haiti’s estimated GDP/PPP is about $11.14 billion or $1,300 per capita.  Real 
growth rate is 3.2 percent, and the inflation rate is 9 percent.  Arable land totals 28 
percent of available land area with agriculture composed of coffee, mangoes, sugar cane, 
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rice, corn, sorghum, and wood.  Unemployment and underemployment is widespread 
throughout Haiti with more than two-thirds of the 3.6 million-person labor force lacking 
formal employment. The labor force is characterized by a shortage of skilled labor with 
unskilled labor overrepresented and distributed within the following sectors: agriculture 
66 percent, services 25 percent, and industry 9 percent.  Haiti’s industrial base is devoted 
to sugar refining, flour milling, textiles, cement, and light assembly industries based on 
imported parts.  Natural resources include bauxite, copper, calcium carbonate, gold, 
marble, and hydropower.  Exports total $554.8 million (2007 est.) with manufactured 
items, coffee, oils, cocoa, and mangoes being the main exports.  Imports total $1.844 
billion with food, manufactured goods, machinery and transport equipment, fuels, and 
raw materials forming the bulk.  Major trading partners include the United States, 
Dominican Republic, Canada, Trinidad and Tobago, Cuba, and the United Kingdom. 
Haiti’s communications infrastructure includes telephones with 145,300 main 
lines in use, and over 500,200 mobile cellular lines in existence.  Radio broadcast stations 
total 41 AM band, 26 FM band and, zero shortwave stations. Television broadcast 
stations total two (plus a cable TV service). Internet hosts total seven, with 650,000 
internet users.  Transportation infrastructure is limited with no railways, no internal 
waterways, and 4,160 km in highways.  Cap-Haitien is the main maritime port and 14 
airports exist with one airport (Toussaint Louverture) capable of international operations 
(infoplease, 2009). 
2. Haitian Earthquake Sequence of Events 
On January 12, 2010 at 1653 local time, Haiti suffered an earthquake with a 
magnitude of 7.0 and epicenter 10 miles southwest of the capital of Port-au-Prince (see 
Figure 7).  As of September 24, according to figures provided by the United States 
Agency for International Development (USAID), approximately 3 million people were 
affected by the disaster with over 230,000 fatalities, and 1.2 million displaced individuals 
(OFDA,2010d).  While not holding the distinction of the largest earthquake in terms of 
seismic energy released, the United States Geological Survey ranks the 2010 Haiti 
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earthquake the third deadliest earthquake in terms of deaths since 1900, and the deadliest 
earthquake in the Western Hemisphere (USGS, n.d.). 
 
 
Figure 7.   Map of Haiti Earthquake Affected Areas (From: USAID, 2010) 
Haiti has served as a focus of activity for humanitarian assistance in the form of 
relief, stability and development efforts by a myriad of NGOs and IGOs.  Despite 
longstanding aid and assistance, Haiti has not progressed to the level of prosperity of 
other countries within the Western Hemisphere, having the ignoble distinction of being a 
pauper nation with Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) (2010) estimates placing 80 
percent of the population living below the poverty line, and 54 percent of the population 
living in the most destitute and abject conditions.  Such is the deleterious effect that 
Haiti’s continued instability could have on international peace and security. On April 30, 
2004, the U.N. established MINUSTAH under Chapter VII of the U.N. Charter with a 
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mandate emphasizing “a secure and stable environment, the political process, and human 
rights” (Margesson & Taft-Morales, 2010, p. 5).  The CIA’s assessment of Haiti notes 
that its economic plight is rooted in social/political instability and lack of infrastructure, 
leaving most of the population dependent on a subsistence economy and foreign 
remittances from relatives for their survival and the Government of Haiti (GoH) 
dependent on international economic assistance (CIA, 2010).  
Given Haiti’s daunting political and economic reality, it is no surprise that 
whenever misfortune visits the country, the assistance of other nations is necessary to 
mitigate the suffering of the victims and survivors.  However, the devastation of the 
January 2010 earthquake was a unique event requiring efforts beyond the natural 
protocols followed by humanitarian organizations.  The next pages describe how that aid 
and the efforts in its distribution unfolded in the face of unique circumstances and inter-
organizational relationships of responders that affected logistics of aid deployment. 
In the immediate aftermath of the earthquake, it was determined that a significant 
catastrophic event had taken place, with the GoH, the U.N. Stabilization Mission in Haiti 
(MINUSTAH), and numerous front-line humanitarian organizations being severely 
compromised in their ability to function and respond in an effective manner due to losses 
in capacities, resources and staff (Inter-Agency Standing Committee [IASC], 2010, p. 1).  
With the realization of the dire situation facing the country, the GoH requested aid from 
the international community (Keen et al., 2010, p. 7). 
On January 13, U.S. Ambassador to Haiti Kenneth H. Merten declared a disaster; 
thereby, setting into motion the bureaucratic framework that the Office of U.S. Foreign 
Disaster Assistance (OFDA), a part of USAID’s Bureau for Democracy, Conflict and 
Humanitarian Assistance (DCHA), uses to facilitate and coordinate U.S. government 
assistance overseas (OFDA, 2010b). A Disaster Response Team (USAID/DART), along 
with an urban search and rescue from Fairfax County, VA, landed within 24 hours of  the 
earthquake, with a Washington D.C.-based response management team to support the 
DART in-country (OFDA, 2010b).  OFDA also provided an initial $50,000 grant through 
the U.S. Embassy to implement a response program based on DART assessments of the 
situation at hand to coordinate follow-on aid from emergency relief stocks. 
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Lieutenant General P. K. “Ken” Keen, deputy commander for U.S. Southern 
Command, arrived in Haiti the day prior to the earthquake, and was with Ambassador 
Merten minutes prior to the earthquake (Keen et al., 2010, p. 7).  After evaluating the 
situation on the ground, General Keen requested the deployment of U.S. defense assets to 
Haiti after ascertaining that the scope of the devastation was beyond the capability of any 
one organization (Keen et al., 2010, p. 7).  U.S. Southern Command, recognizing the 
necessity of command and control for the growing military presence established Joint 
Task Force-Haiti (JTF-Haiti) on January 14 to support USAID efforts as the lead U.S. 
agency for humanitarian assistance and disaster relief operations (United States Southern 
Command, 2010).  Seeking to avoid disruption of organizational structures and linkages 
in conflict with MINUSTAH and contributing forces to the UN presence that would 
ensue with the creation of a combined task force, Joint Task Force—Haiti (JTF-Haiti) 
was established with the purpose of “support U.S. efforts in Haiti to mitigate near-term 
human suffering and accelerate relief efforts to facilitate transition to the Government of 
Haiti, the UN, and USAID” (Keen et al., 2010, p. 8).  Keen identified that while the 
military was capable in emergency situations, the long-term follow-on relief and 
reconstruction efforts were best left to IGOs and NGOs (Keen et al., 2010, p. 8).  The 
U.S. role in what later became Operation UNIFIED RESPONSE was clearly defined as 
one of a primary humanitarian assistance mission with limited security operations only to 
support the primary mission under the aegis of a U.N. security presence provided by 
MINUSTAH (Keen et al., 2010, p. 8).   
On January 13, the deployment of the 1st Special Operations Wing to coordinate 
the departure and arrival of aircraft at Toussaint Louverture International Airport, and the 
evacuation of American citizens and delivery of relief supplies by military aircraft and 
U.S. Coast Guard cutter HIGGINS, served as the first response by tasked Southern 
Command elements (United States Southern Command, 2010).  The Southern Command 
Phase I (initial emergency response) of Operation UNIFIED RESPONSE lasted from 




• Restore medical capacity 
• Distribute shelter, food, and water 
• Integrate with MINUSTAH and NGOs 
• Support Haitians 
• Opening the airport and seaport to allow the entrance of humanitarian aid 
(Keen et al., 2010, p. 9) 
After addressing the chaotic needs faced in Phase I, Phase II (relief) commenced on 
February 5 and focused on transitioning to a more deliberate plan that handed over 
responsibilities to the GoH and NGOs, as by this time, they were in more of a stable and 
secure position (Keen et al., 2010, p. 9).  The priorities for the relief phase were the 
following. 
• Support efforts to provide shelter, establish settlements, and conduct 
debris removal 
• Transition JTF-Haiti humanitarian assistance and disaster relief efforts to 
capable partners when ready 
• Plan, coordinate, and prepare to execute a phased transition to smaller but 
longer-term force structure and operations (Keen et al., 2010, p. 9) 
In parallel with U.S. efforts in the emergency response phase, NGO efforts were 
encountering a scenario that presented significant challenges in regards to logistics and 
coordination due to the scale of devastation, but coupled as well with the unfamiliarity of 
a disaster in an urban context that presented significant challenges with which most 
groups were unfamiliar (IASC, 2010, p. 1).  While many international humanitarian 
actors have had a long presence within Haiti, as with the MINUSTAH, many faced 
significant losses in talent, experience and response capacity due to the earthquake 
(IASC, 2010, p. 8).  Recognizing the dire humanitarian situation, an influx of 
“varied…international actors” responded to the call for assistance from the GoH with 
OCHA estimating over 400 different actors by the end of January (IASC, 2010, p. 8).  
The UN Cluster system was reactivated January 15 with the Logistics Cluster serving to 
establish common logistics services for humanitarian actors to remove logistics 
bottlenecks and improve supply chain efficiency to include the following. 
• Providing and managing storage capacity in Port-au-Prince and outlying 
provinces 
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• Establishing logistics hubs in Port-au-Prince and the Dominican Republic 
• Providing transportation services using helicopters, other air assets, trucks 
and boats 
• Managing incoming air cargo 
• Liaising with Dominican authorities to expedite customs requirements 
(IASC, 2010, p. 15) 
Although it is implicit that the intention of all humanitarian actors responding to 
this episode was the well being of the Haiti and its citizens, there were “significant 
challenges which impeded the efficiency of the first phase of the response, and some of 
which continue to the present [six months after the earthquake]” (IASC, 2010, p. 16).  
Logistics were impeded by “damage and excessive demand” on Toussaint Louverture 
International Airport and the destruction of the port facilities at Port-au-Prince (IASC, 
2010, p. 16), which required the use of airport facilities in Santo Domingo, Dominican 
Republic as a logistics node and the subsequent use of over-land transport to affected 
areas in Haiti.  Logistics were further complicated by the poor condition of the roads, 
which further deteriorated due to the increased utilization, debris-strewn affected areas in 
Haiti, and limited receipt and storage capability in Port-au-Prince (IASC, 2010, p. 16).  
Contentious accusations in the heated first days erupted against the U.S. military 
regarding control and prioritization of airlifts of search and rescue assets over 
medical/relief supplies at Toussaint Louverture International (especially by Médecins 
Sans Frontières), thereby nullifying the effect of many organizations’ plans to transport 
stocks from regional and international warehouses after in-country stores were depleted 
(IASC, 2010, p. 16).   
The early days of the first phase of the humanitarian response were thus 
characterized. 
…logistics constraints caused by destroyed infrastructure, systems, and 
capacity; widespread underlying vulnerability and poverty; a Government 
and humanitarian community severely affected; and the arrival…of a 
plethora of humanitarian actors with varying capacities, resources and 
agenda…. 
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…A more focused and better defined inter-cluster coordination capacity 
would have contributed to ensuring greater cohesion between the strategic 
and operational levels of the response (IASC, 2010, p. 17).   
D. CHAPTER SUMMARY 
This chapter provided country case literature for Chile and Haiti with respects to 
pre-disaster condition, as well as the sequence of events in the aftermath of their 
respective earthquakes.  By examining each country’s pre-disaster condition and post-
disaster response, a cross case examination of the effectiveness of the humanitarian 
response can be conducted to gain insight into the factors that contributed to the overall 
effort.  
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IV. ASSESSING HUMANITARIAN RESPONSE 
A. INTRODUCTION 
Based on the literature review in Chapter II, this chapter offers a cross case 
comparison between humanitarian relief efforts in Chile and Haiti.  In particular, several 
dimensions within the aid response are compared to determine salient similarities and 
differences in the collaborative efforts of humanitarian actors.  In particular, civil 
stability, food distribution and services restoration, infrastructure and information 
networks are identified as prominent for understanding the successes and failures of 
collaboration in the midst of a complex disaster event. 
B. POST-EARTHQUAKE CIVIL STABILITY 
1. Chile 
According to Zilbechi (2010), earthquakes and tsunamis will create havoc in any 
society and will shed light on social cracks and fissures invisible in everyday life and 
provoke social crises that states tend to resolve with militarization (p. 2).  These 
simultaneous catastrophes severely tested the emergency response strategies of the GoC.  
As is the case with sudden onset disasters, there was in this disaster too little time for 
preparation and notice for the government to act with an appropriate scaled response.  
Within hours, hundreds of looters ransacked grocery, clothing, and electronic stores.  
Looting spread to other parts of the country, such as Santiago, Chillan, and Talcahuano.  
In times of large catastrophes, government institutions, public services, and private 
institutions are often overwhelmed and fail.  A common sentiment felt by victims was: 
I am amazed by the absence of the state during the first two days of the 
tragedy.  There was nobody to give us information, nobody to give us 
help.  That’s why there was a loss of control, one felt often abandoned. 
(Estrada, 2010) 
It begs the question, why was the GoC sluggish to respond to the looting and civil unrest 
in affected areas?  The failure of effective collaboration between the GoC and the Chilean 
Armed Forces, and local law enforcement in the initial aftermath led to a perception of an 
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absence of authority in which citizens felt they needed to take actions into their own 
hands.  This set in motion the complication of having to establish government authority 
in the midst of unrest, complicating the distribution of aid and relief.  
Some suggest the main issue for President Bachelet was a trust issue in the 
government resulting in hesitation to mobilize the military to restore order and affect 
logistical support for relief operations.  Professor Constanza Gerding, a resident of 
Concepción, recalled that soldiers were a constant and often brutal presence during the 
Pinochet regime, which saw her father, a journalist during that period, imprisoned 
(Neuman & Beaubien, 2010).  Bachelet herself was a victim of human right abuses and 
forced exile during the Pinochet regime, with her father, a senior air force officer, 
perishing under incarceration (Long, 2010).  Observers hypothesized this lingering 
trauma within Chilean society, and especially with a left of center government, was a root 
cause of the hesitation in deploying the Armed Forces.  With the military in the streets, 
the potential for a tense environment between citizens and soldiers was a factor to be 
considered. 
For some Chileans, seeing the military on the streets evoked painful memories of 
the 1970s and 1980s under the tight dictatorial government of General Augusto Pinochet.  
Government minister Sergio Baltar stated, “imagine for a coalition that has governed this 
country for 20 years and that fought against the dictatorship, the idea of having the 
military on the streets was not easy” (Long, 2010).  However, the devastation of the 
earthquake required the response capacity of the Armed Forces; the GoC and its military 
needed to come together to provide humanitarian relief and security that is the mandate of 
government.  For Chileans, the military was received with cries of “finally, we have 
soldiers proud of their role in keeping the peace, a welcome feeling for many since their 
military generally have not been used for police work during the 20 years of democracy” 
(CBS Network, 2010).  Although the specter of civil/military strife of the Pinochet 
regime loomed in the national psyche, the GoC, the military and other actors on the 




As aforementioned, natural disasters tend to expose and magnify the relative 
shortcomings of institutions in their ability to function.  In the case of Haiti, the 
earthquake had a devastating effect on the effectiveness of the GoH to respond to the 
needs of its population.  Fourteen of sixteen government ministries and numerous local 
and national government officials perished in the earthquake (Keen et al., 2010, p. 2).  
GoH capacity to lead and coordinate a response was thus limited from the beginning of 
the crisis with the human and material losses within critical response coordination 
agencies (IASC, 2010, p. 7).  Almost immediately, the GoH realized that the disaster was 
beyond the scope of their capability and capacity, necessitating coordination with the 
international community to best direct aid efforts in health, food, water, fuel, and safety 
sectors for all affected geographic areas (IASC, 2010, p. 7). 
International involvement has been a constant for Haiti due to its status as a failed 
state.  The recurrence of disasters, whether natural or political, have always triggered an 
international response for the sake of regional security interests in the Western 
Hemisphere, culminating in the presence of MINUSTAH as U.N. agent for security and 
development of emerging democratic institutions in Haiti (Keen et al., 2010, p. 7).  
However, MINUSTAH, as well as other experienced international humanitarian actors, 
were affected with the significant losses of headquarters and senior staff (Keen et al., 
2010, pp. 7–8).  The international presence in Chile was quite spartan in comparison to 
Haiti, which was overwhelmed with a “plethora of humanitarian actors with varying 
capacities, resources and agendas” who answered the call for assistance (IASC, 2010, p. 
17).  This influx of actors was poorly coordinated, with the U.N. Humanitarian Country 
Team (HCT) only established after three weeks of activity, then having to absorb 
coordination efforts already colored with a strong military character in the absence of 
effective non-military leadership, which created resentment and offense amongst actors 
(IASC, 2010, p. 17).  Reflecting the perceptions of Haitian entities, many NGOs that did 
not have existing relationships in country prior to the earthquake, did not fully engage 
with Haitian authorities, losing opportunities to utilize local knowledge and capabilities 
(IASC, 2010, p. 17), and at times, duplicating efforts over existing Haitian frameworks 
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(IASC, 2010, p. 18).  The suboptimal level of initial response can be argued to be due to 
the lack of collaboration and leadership from Haitian authorities and international actors 
that impacted coordination efforts in the immediacy of the disaster (IASC, 2010, p. 17). 
C. FOOD DISTRIBUTION AND RESTORATION OF BASIC SERVICES 
1. Chile 
Natural disasters, such as a large magnitude earthquake, frequently expose 
societal stratifications and accesses to resources that manifest in some form of 
deprivation.  In the case of Chile, rural areas and those of lower socio-economic status 
were affected the most.  According to Phillips (2010), the middle class and less rural 
cities were the first recipients of humanitarian aid, as well as the first to have basic 
services restored.  In contrast, working class communities, such as Quilicura, located 
thirty minutes from the center of Santiago, residents went without water and electricity 
for three days with riots and looting occurring despite the minimal damage reported in the 
Santiago area (Hernandez, 2010).  “We are the last ones to get services,” said Elizabeth 
Meza, a store owner, “they looted everything” (Hernandez, 2010).  As often is the case 
with many nations in Central and South America, the poor and indigenous are last to get 
assistance, as was the case of the Mapuches, the largest indigenous, and poorest, group in 
Chile (Meyer, 2010, p. 4).  Mapuches live mainly in the central and southern regions of 
the country and have suffered many difficulties since the earthquake; their homes were 
completely destroyed and access to water and electricity was cut off entirely (Beittel & 
Margesson, 2010, p. 4). 
An earthquake of such magnitude, Chile was not immune to the anxieties of their 
citizens that rapidly led to the erosion of public order.  Despite its status as a modern, 
democratic, market oriented nation with a robust economy and developed infrastructure, 
social divisions bedeviled the delivery and prioritization of aid and recovery.   
2. Haiti 
Poor information resources, compounded by a devastated urban setting, an 
operation that was a new scenario for NGOs where there was little experience or training 
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to confront, impacted the distribution of food and commodities.  Haiti was characterized 
by the decimation of a congested urban area, compounding access in and around major 
afflicted zones (IASC, 2010, p. 1).  The lack of coordination in areas led to the migration 
of afflicted persons from the centralized zone in Port-au-Prince to outlying areas further 
compounding distribution issues and complicating relief efforts in these areas (IASC, 
2010, p. 5).  Also, the desire to expedite issuance of aid, despite the challenges of access 
due to local terrain, lead to distribution issues (air drops) that did not take into account 
the particulars of women and children, leading to severe criticism from local NGOs that 
felt that expediency led to a depersonalization of efforts that dehumanized the victims.  
Many of these actions were not coordinated and were of an emergent ad-hoc basis as a 
flood of personnel rushed in to aid (IASC, 2010, p. 27).  There was little control at the 
borders at the beginning and it could be argued that Haiti was invaded by a multitude of 
people wanting to help, but creating more problems than they solved.  Prioritization of 
unit level activities, instead of a completely coordinated effort, led to a dysfunctional 
approach.  Delays in assistance in localized areas within the cities, and rural areas, as well 
as damage to central cities, were significant and created migratory pressures leading out 
of afflicted zones to rural area and less devastated regions, complicating relief efforts and 
requiring evolving solutions to emerging requirements.  
D.  INFRASTRUCTURE 
1. Chile 
As Chile is located in a highly seismic region, the GoC has established strict 
building codes with respect to infrastructure (AON Benfield, 2010, p. 9).  The history of 
Chilean building code regulation was established in 1935 with updates in 1972, 1985, 
1996, and 2003 (AON Benfield, 2010, p. 9).  Sixty percent of residential structures and 
forty percent of commercial buildings in the nation are of masonry construction, with 
other structures comprised of concrete or steel construction (AON Benfield, 2010, p. 9).  
According to Lafsky (2010), in 1960, a massive 9.5 earthquake struck Chile that led the 
GoC to implement stricter building codes.  Chile is a modernized and industrialized 
nation, with a per capita economic output that is more than 10 times larger than Haiti; 
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thus, emergency resources are more available and the population is better educated as to 
the safest places to take refuge (Lafsky, 2010).  According to BBC News (2010), the 
earthquake’s epicenter was 21 miles underground and occurred off-shore, meaning it was 
70 miles from the nearest large city, Concepción.  In comparison to Haiti, the epicenter 
was only 8 miles underground and located right next to the capital city (Reuben, 2010).  
2. Haiti 
The island of Hispaniola, comprised of the nations of Haiti and the Dominican 
Republic, located between the North American tectonic plate and the Caribbean plate, 
which are sliding each year at a rate of about 20 millimeters, has suffered very little 
seismic activity in recent decades (Schuman, 2010, p. 1).  In 2004, the USGS upgraded 
its monitoring system in the Caribbean for earthquakes and tsunamis following the 2004 
Indian Ocean earthquake and tsunami that killed thousands across the Indian Ocean area.  
The USGS also produced earthquake-hazard studies for the Caribbean and proposed 
mitigation suggestions for the region. However, according to William McCann, a 
seismologist and Caribbean consultant to the USGS, Haiti's earthquake preparedness has 
been “minimal to none, there were just so many problems there and only so much money, 
and you have to prioritize” (Schuman, 2010, p. 1).  McCann also adds that the Dominican 
Republic could be setting itself up for the same problems by constructing 30-story 
buildings in seismically dangerous zones. The Dominican Republic this year is set to start 
updating 30-year-old building codes whose enforcement has been very poor, and Haiti's 
preparedness has been “in a much more precarious state” (Schuman, 2010, p. 1).     
The differences in economic infrastructures, resources, and prioritization in 
enforcement and investment led to success in Chile, and were the antecedents for chronic 
underdevelopment and devastation that afflicted Haiti in the aftermath of the earthquake. 
E. INFORMATION NETWORKS 
1. Chile 
In cases of natural disasters, communication efforts are typically complex, 
requiring coordination amongst actors in the collaborative efforts in humanitarian aid.  In 
the case of Chile, after lines of communications were established, the government started 
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to provide relief to victims in affected areas under the leadership of the Chilean National 
Emergency Office (ONEMI), which also coordinated relief efforts with international and 
local humanitarian organizations.  
Initially criticized for a slow response, subsequent analysis shows the GoC and 
Chilean Armed Forces effectively assessed their requirements with respects to aid and 
communicated them with other countries, complementing their ongoing rescue and relief 
efforts in distributing food and water within days after the earthquake (Beittel & 
Margesson, 2010, p. 4).  Applying an analogy with origins in supply chain management, 
the GoC coordinated requirements and demands for resources in a “pull” orientation vice 
a “push” mechanism, i.e., pulling the right level of humanitarian resources rather than 
having resources pushed based on assumptions made by foreign actors (NGOs).  Making 
demands and baselines clear from the onset helped to facilitate collaboration with actors 
outside of the GoC as was the case with the Chilean Red Cross “working in close 
coordination with the GoC, providing limited search and rescue services, administering 
first aid and distributing pre-positioned supplies” (American Red Cross, 2010). 
Despite these successes, significant failures occurred as well with the Chilean 
Navy facing government criticism for the failure to notify residents of coastal villages 
about the tsunami threat after the earthquake (AON Benfield, 2010, p. 10).  This calls 
into question the command and control capabilities within the Chilean Armed Forces and 
up the chain of command, especially with respects to the inaction the first few hours after 
the earthquake and tsunami. 
2. Haiti 
With respects to Haiti, the IASC (2010) identified deficiencies and delays in the 
collection and dissemination of data detailing the “number, location, and activities of 
humanitarian organizations, and on sectoral needs, coverage and gaps” (IASC, 2010, p. 
24).  Imperfect information on actors, their actions, and their areas of assistance 
complicated efforts to conduct efficient operations resulting in sub-optimization of effort 
during the initial response to the disaster.  Availability of technology, infrastructure, and 
communication protocols within a post-earthquake environment has a significant impact 
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on the strategy and mechanism of coordination.  The failures of communication and 
information management were rooted in the relative “lack of willingness by agencies to 
prioritize reporting on activities, particularly in the initial stages of the response” (IASC, 
2010, p. 24).   
It can be surmised that this lack of prioritization is a reflection of the 
organizational culture of many NGOs, which place an emphasis on action and response to 
a disaster, based on their own prioritizations, and not necessarily based on the needs of 
affected peoples. Priority on the effort of data collection and information management are 
administrative actions that consume resources in personnel and money; resources that 
NGOs feel may be better placed in direct aid to afflicted populations.  Due to the 
independent and decentralized characteristics of the many humanitarian actors involved 
in Haiti, in contrast with the near insular action in Chile, many assessments “followed 
different standards, methods, and focuses…hampering efforts to create an overview of 
cross cluster needs” (IASC, 2010, p. 24).  The IASC recognizes the lack of 
standardization of information and performance metrics disrupts the unity of effort, 
“challenges the principle of impartiality, and leads to a breakdown in communication 
with partners” and the ability to assess and monitor the totality of effort (IASC, 2010, pp. 
24–25).  Ultimately, a lead, OCHA as an arm of the U.N., is identified with the 
responsibility to “ensure… adequate and appropriate inter-cluster information 
management support to the overall response” (IASC, 2010, p. 24).  
F. CHAPTER SUMMARY 
This chapter presented a cross case comparison of the respective humanitarian 
relief efforts of Chile and Haiti.  Specific issues common to both scenarios were 
identified and compared to understand the unique collaborative issues that arose within 
each disaster event.  In the case of Chile, an effective national government, capable 
Armed Forces, and well-designed and maintained infrastructure were evidence of the 
inherent capacity for collaboration within Chilean institutions, which later facilitated 
collaboration amongst other humanitarian actors.  In Haiti, an ineffective national 
government, poor urban planning and infrastructure compounded efforts to provide 
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humanitarian assistance which led to many well-intentioned humanitarian actors (albeit 
possessing different values and agendas) attempting to fill the vacuum of effective 
leadership, complicating coordination and collaboration efforts in the overall response.   
The nature of rapid onset natural disasters and the response required in the 
aftermath are unique and specific to each event.  Not only must humanitarian actors react 
accordingly to the treacherous physical environments in which they operate, but they also 
must coordinate the complex demands of cooperating with other actors.  The next and 
final chapter, conclusions and future considerations, are presented with the intent of 
improving collaboration amongst humanitarian actors. 
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In reviewing the cases of the Chilean and Haitian disaster response, the scale and 
scope of humanitarian relief efforts that characterized the outcome in each country were a 
reflection of the collaboration of the numerous actors present, and their ability to resolve 
the organizational conflicts between them.  Despite the identification of collaboration and 
leadership as essential factors for success, it still remains as the issue needing the most 
improvement.  A majority of actors feels that collaboration is critical to success of 
efforts; however, a sizable minority has a contrary opinion that collaboration and 
coordination erode operational capability of individual actors, or compromise 
organizational agency fundamental to their existence (Harvey et al., 2010, p. 42). 
While much progress has been made to present a more structured collaborative 
model with the U.N.’s adoption of the Cluster System, and the DoD placing Civil-
Military Operations and Foreign Humanitarian Assistance as part of the Joint Doctrine, 
significant dysfunction still remains with humanitarian efforts.  Not being able to 
overcome organizational biases and parochial thinking result in failures to plan and train 
in the aftermath of disasters, which  in turn, prevents the possibility of healing amongst 
humanitarian actors, and impairs the re-orientation of actors to new frameworks and 
relationships that would better serve the values and ethos of the humanitarian system.  
This has second-order effects among institutions of governments, IGOs/NGOs, and 
militaries that result in 1) failure to standardize, 2) failure to build contingency and 
infrastructure (physical or organizational), and 3) failure to create a more efficient 
collaborative mechanism in responding to disaster. For organizations that still do not trust 
each other, lingering issues remain that are still present and have not been overcome 
despite continued identification.  For some, little incentive exists to change; rather 
pressure seeks to preserve the status quo.  Continued focus and effort are needed to 
remedy these deficiencies as they create suboptimal responses to dire humanitarian 
tragedies.  The world expects better of the humanitarian system. 
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Technology has progressed to increased levels of openness and accessibility, 
offering opportunities that can advance collaboration and communication amongst 
humanitarian actors.  However, these opportunities elude the humanitarian system as the 
benefits of technology have not been fully integrated within the humanitarian system, as 
actors have not seen its relevance.  Before that can occur, the identification of meaningful 
and useful protocols, hierarchies and information standardization must be created based 
on the values and needs of individual actors (Maynard, 1999, p. 210).  A consensus must 
work toward this effort or the result will be information systems that do not effectively 
communicate amongst the humanitarian actors, rendering technology useless from the 
onset.   
Collaboration amongst humanitarian actors is not all pervasive during a disaster 
event, and most often comes to a complete halt at the end of an event preventing 
organizational healing within the humanitarian system.  Organizational healing that 
creates new relationships and frameworks, resulting in the refocusing and reorienting of 
humanitarian actors to more virtuous actions in line with their common values, is absent 
when collaboration stops at the end of the humanitarian operations.  This lack of 
interaction prevents the interchange of ideas that result in common strategy or 
standardization.  Opportunities exist for maintaining continuity and increasing 
interactions between all sectors in the humanitarian system, and efforts should be 
continued in this regard.  By increasing interactions with those vested in seeing 
improvements in this realm, the formalization and professionalization of humanitarian 
logistics and relief response can occur.  Maynard (1997) contends that the increased 
complexity of disasters require the interaction of a formalized systems-based approach 
that addresses the issues and requirements of actors in an “efficient and organized 
manner” (p. 200).  Maynard suggests that insular reflection only achieves limited strides; 
efforts that are creative, innovative and collaborative, encompassing the many actors of 
the humanitarian effort, are required for comprehensive change (Maynard, 1999, pp. 
200–201).  As themes turn into issues, and issues result in strategy, then mechanisms and 
incentives can be devised for an improved functioning of the allocation of scarce physical 
and human resources, and response mechanisms to distribute them effectively.  
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Leadership and collaboration amongst NGOs, IGOs, governments, and donors, is a 
prerequisite before further improvement can occur. 
Difficulties occur in integrating the tensions that a crisis produces among 
humanitarian organizations, government agencies, and military actors in the collaborative 
process during a disaster.  Collinson (2010) notes that no effective framework exists to 
channel the energy of humanitarian actors (primarily NGOs) to work toward a 
transformative strategy to improve their relationship with governments.  A realpolitik that 
reconciles the idealism of the humanitarian system with the politics that emanate from the 
competition for resources and agenda setting is a matter of considerable debate, but one 
of considerable importance.  
For future consideration, it is important to investigate the development of 
mechanisms, whether in policy, funding, or training, to encourage a collaborative process 
for cooperation in humanitarian efforts.  Also, an investigation into the development of 
an enhanced humanitarian corps (e.g., increasing the size of USAID), or the creation of a 
professional humanitarian subspecialty within militaries (beyond the scope of 
peacekeeping and security) that maintain long-term connections and competencies are 
often eroded by the rotation of key personnel.   
In conclusion, this project examined recent humanitarian disasters of Chile and 
Haiti through organizational behavior models of collaboration, conflict, and healing to 
gain insight as to the factors that lead to the success and failure in responding to complex 
humanitarian emergencies.  As detailed in recent literature, continued focus on 
collaboration is still warranted and required, as failures in coordination remain constant 
in humanitarian response for both the Chilean and Haitian disasters.  However, continued 
failures in collaboration and coordination efforts should not be viewed as an indication of 
inevitable futility, but as an opportunity for determined and focused involvement.  Retreat 
from this endeavor cannot be an option; our principles of decency and humanity require 
our best efforts. 
 54
THIS PAGE INTENTIONALLY LEFT BLANK 
 55
APPENDIX. DONOR CONTRIBUTIONS AND PLEDGES TO CHILE 






In-kind Support Pledge 
Argentina  
Delivery of 1,800 tons of food, a half million liters of 
water, four water purification plants and four 
electricity power generators, Argentine Air Force 
hospital composed of 12 modules, 10,000 doses of 
vaccine against hepatitis A.  
Australia 4,413,063 Fifty generators, 150 family tents and 1,060 collapsible beds 
Bolivia  40 tons of drinking water 
Brazil  
Two C-130s from the Brazilian Air Force 
transporting 18 tons of equipment for a field hospital, 
and 66 military staff provided 150 tents with a 
capacity for 10 people each. 
Canada  Provided 150 tents with a capacity for 10 people each. 
China 2,000,000 
Chartered plane with earthquake-relief: carrying 700 
tents, 10,000 blankets, 100 portable generators and 
two water purifiers, for a total of 96 tons 
Cuba  26 member medical team and field hospital 
Finland 539,811  
France  
Chartered a special plane to bring to Chile a 
scientific, technical and humanitarian assistance 
mission, (including a team of seismological experts 
and a team of infrastructure experts), plus one ton of 
seismological material (27 seismological stations, 
solar panels, and GPS), complete satellite equipment 
and 10 Iridium telephones, a dialysis and water 
filtration machine, first aid medicines, community 
tents, and five water purification stations  
Germany  Four-member rescue team. 
Greece 269,906  
Indonesia 1,000,000  
Japan 3,336,625 Dispatch of international emergency medical team, electric generators, tents, water purifiers. 
Republic of 
Korea  
Dispatch of plane with medical equipments and non-
perishables food.  








In-kind Support Pledge 
Mexico  
Three tons of water purification equipment (chlorine, 
etc.) and a team of eight specialists to evaluate 
structures. 
New Zealand 343,407  
Norway 1,675,042  
Peru 
  
Two airplanes with 30 tons of relief items including 
tents, plastic sheets, water purification unit; search 
and rescue team of 35 specialists; one field hospital 
with surgical capacity and in-patient hospital care; 21 
doctors 
Russia  
One plane with 28 MT of relief items (100 tents, 10 
portable power generators, 2,000 blankets and seven 
tons of food) 
Singapore 50,000  
Spain  7.5 tons of relief items, one field hospital, and a team of 75 experts (firefighters and sanitation experts) 
Sweden 720,041  
Switzerland 276,753 Dispatched a three-person regional Rapid Response Team  
United Kingdom 382,263 600 tents for up to 3,000 people 
United States 10,700,000 Various type of assistance and relief supplies via USAID 
Uruguay  Two water purification machines 
Venezuela  Seven tons of relief supplies  and assessment team of 27 experts 
Vietnam 150,000  
   
Other:   
   
Organizations of 
American States 25,000 










(From: U.N. OCHA as cited in Beittel & Margesson, 2010) 
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